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Abstract
Recently, several authors have criticized the time-symmetrized quantum theory
originated by the work of Aharonov et al. (1964). The core of this criticism was
a proof, appearing in various forms, which showed that the counterfactual inter-
pretation of time-symmetrized quantum theory cannot be reconciled with standard
quantum theory. I argue here that the apparent contradiction is due to a logical
error. I analyze the concept of counterfactuals in quantum theory and introduce
time-symmetrized counterfactuals. These counterfactuals do not lead to any con-
tradiction with the predictions of quantum theory. I discuss applications of time-
symmetrized counterfactuals to several surprising examples and show the usefulness
of the time-symmetrized quantum formalism.
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1. Introduction. I shall discuss measurements performed on a pre- and post-selected
quantum system, i.e. at a time between two other measurements. The time-symmetrized
formalism describing such systems was proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz
(ABL) (1964) and has been developed in recent years. A partial list of references includes
Aharonov et al. (1985), Aharonov and Vaidman (1990, 1991). Several authors criticized
the time-symmetrized approach to quantum theory in general and some of its particular
applications. The most representative example is the work of Sharp and Shanks (1993).
They presented a proof, which was later repeated and used by others, that the counter-
factual interpretation of the ABL probability rule (Eq. 2 below) cannot be reconciled
with the standard quantum theory. I shall claim here that the proof contains a logical
error. I shall analyze the concept of counterfactuals in quantum theory and introduce
time-symmetrized counterfactuals. The ABL rule can be applied to such counterfactuals
and I shall present situations for which it is useful.
The plan of this work is as follows. In Section 2 I present a brief review of the
time-symmetrized formalism. In section 3 I analyze the concept of counterfactuals in
quantum theory and introduce time-symmetrized counterfactuals. Section 4 is devoted to
the analysis of the inconsistency proof of Sharp and Shanks and its variations. In section
5 I discuss related time asymmetry preconceptions in quantum theory. In section 6 the
time symmetry (and asymmetry) of the process of quantum measurement is analyzed
in order to give a rigorous context to the previous discussion of the time symmetry of
the ABL rule. Applications of time asymmetric and time symmetric counterfactuals in
quantum theory are considered in sections 7-9. Section 10 summarize the arguments of
the paper.
2. Time-Symmetrized Formalism. In standard quantum theory a complete descrip-
tion of a system at a given time is given by a quantum state |Ψ〉. It yields the probabilities
for all outcomes ai of a measurement of any observable A according to the equation
Prob(ai) = |〈Ψ|PA=ai|Ψ〉|, (1)
where PA=ai is the projection operator on the subspace defined by A = ai. Eq. 1 is
intrinsically asymmetric in time: the state |Ψ〉 is determined by some measurements in
the past and it evolves toward the future. The time evolution between the measurements,
however, is considered time symmetric since it is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation for
which each forward evolving solution has its counterpart (its complex conjugate with some
other well understood simple changes) evolving backward in time. The asymmetry in time
of the standard quantum formalism is manifested in the absence of the quantum state
evolving backward in time from future measurements (relative to the time in question).
Time-symmetrized quantum theory describes a system at a given time by a two-
state vector 〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉. It yields the (conditional) probabilities for all outcomes ai of a
measurement of any observable A according to the generalization of the ABL formula
(Aharonov and Vaidman, 1991):
Prob(ai) =
|〈Ψ2|PA=ai|Ψ1〉|2
∑
j |〈Ψ2|PA=aj |Ψ1〉|2
. (2)
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The time symmetry means that 〈Ψ2| and |Ψ1〉 enter the equations, and thus govern the
observable results, on equal footings. Moreover, the time symmetry means that, in regard
to time symmetric measurements, a system described by the two-state vector 〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉 is
identical to a system described by the two-state vector 〈Ψ1||Ψ2〉. I will analyze the time
symmetry of the process of measurement in section 6; here I only point out that ideal
measurements are time symmetric. Indeed, the symmetry under the interchange of 〈Ψ2|
and |Ψ1〉 is explicit in Eq. 2 which refers to ideal measurements.
Another basic concept of time-symmetrized two-state vector formalism is weak value.
An (almost) standard measurement procedure for measuring observable A with weakened
coupling (which we call weak measurement, Aharonov and Vaidman 1990) yields the weak
value of A:
Aw ≡ 〈Ψ2|A|Ψ1〉〈Ψ2|Ψ1〉 . (3)
Here again, 〈Ψ2| and |Ψ1〉 enter the equations on equal footings. However, when we
interchange 〈Ψ2| and |Ψ1〉, the weak value changes to its complex conjugate. Thus, in
this situation, as for the Schro¨dinger equation, time reversal is accompanied by complex
conjugation.
In order to explain how to obtain a quantum system described at a given time t by a
two-state vector 〈Ψ2||Ψ1〉 we shall assume for simplicity that the free Hamiltonian of the
system is zero. In this case, it is enough to prepare the system at time t1 prior to time
t in the state |Ψ1〉, to ensure no disturbance between t1 and t as well as between t and
t2, and to find the system at t2 in the state |Ψ2〉. It is crucial that t1 < t < t2, but the
relation between these times and “now” is not fixed. The times t1, t, t2 might all be in
the past, or we can discuss future measurements and then they are all in the future; we
just have to agree to discard all cases when the measurements at time t2 does not yield
the outcome corresponding to the state |Ψ2〉.
Note the asymmetry between the measurement at t1 and the measurement at t2.
Given an ensemble of quantum systems, it is always possible to prepare all of them in
a particular state |Ψ1〉, but we cannot ensure finding the system in a particular state
|Ψ2〉. Indeed, if the pre-selection measurement yielded a result different from projection
on |Ψ1〉 we can always change the state to |Ψ1〉, but if the measurement at t2 did not show
|Ψ2〉, our only choice is to discard such a system from the ensemble. This asymmetry,
however, is not relevant to the problem we consider here. We study the symmetry relative
to the measurements at time t for a given pre- and post-selected system, and we do not
investigate the time-symmetry of obtaining such a system. The only important detail is
that the interaction at time t has to be time symmetric. See more discussion below, in
section 6.
3. Counterfactuals. A general form of a counterfactual statement is
(i) If it were that A, then it would be that B.
There are many philosophical discussions on the concept of counterfactuals and especially
on time’s arrow in counterfactuals. Many of the discussions, e.g. Lewis (1986), Bennett
(1984), are related to A: How come A if in the actual world A is not true? Do we need
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a miracle (a violation of the fundamental law of nature) for A? Does A come by itself,
or it is accompanied by other changes? However, these questions are not relevant to the
problem of counterfactuals in quantum theory. The questions about A are not relevant
because A depends solely on an external system which is not under discussion by the
definition of the problem. Indeed, in quantum theory the counterfactuals have a very
specific form:1
A = a measurement M is performed
B = the outcome of M has property P
The measurement M might consist of measurements of several observables performed
together. The property P might be a certain relation between the results of measurements
of these observables or a probability for a certain relation or for a certain outcome.
It is assumed that the experimenter can make any decision about which measurement
to perform and the question how he makes this decision is not considered. It is assumed
that the experimenter and his measuring devices are not correlated in any way with the
state of the system prior to the measurement. Thus, in the world of the quantum system
no miracles are needed and no changes relative to the actual world have to be made for
different A’s.2
Although one can define counterfactuals of this form in the framework of classical
theory, they are of no interest because they are equivalent to some “factual” statements.
In classical physics any observable has always a definite value and a measurement of the
observable yields this value. Therefore, we can make a one to one correspondence be-
tween “the outcome of a measurement of an observable C is ci” and “the value of C is
ci”. The latter is independent of whether the measurement of C has been performed or
not and, therefore, statements which are formally counterfactual about results of possi-
ble measurements can be replaced by “factual” (unconditional) statements about values
of corresponding observables. In contrast, in standard quantum theory, observables, in
general, do not have definite values and therefore we cannot always reduce the above
counterfactual statements to “factual” statements.
Most of the discussions of counterfactuals in quantum theory are in the context of
EPR-Bell type experiments. Some of the examples are Skyrms (1982), Peres (1993),
Mermin (1989) (which, however, does not use the word counterfactual), and Bedford
and Stapp (1995) who even present an analysis of a Bell-type argument in the formal
language of the Lewis (1973) theory of counterfactuals. The common situation is that
a composite system is described at a certain time by some entangled state and then an
array of incompatible measurements on this system at a later time is considered. Various
conclusions are derived from statements about the results of these measurements. Since
these measurements are incompatible they cannot be all performed together, so it must
1This definition of counterfactuals in quantum theory is broad enough for discussing issues relevant
to this paper. However, in some cases the term “counterfactuals” was used differently. For example, in
Penrose (1994, p.240) “counterfactuals are things that might have happened, although they did not in
fact happen.”
2Indeterminism of standard quantum theory allows us to discuss even the worlds which include the
experimenter without invoking miracles. Consider an experimenter who chooses between different mea-
surements according to a random outcome of another quantum experiment.
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be that at least some of them were not actually performed. This is why they are called
counterfactual statements.
These counterfactuals are explicitly asymmetric in time. The asymmetry is neither in
A nor in B; both are about a single time t. The asymmetry is in the description of the
actual world. The past and not the future (relative to t) of a system is given.
This, however, is not the only asymmetry of the counterfactuals in quantum theory
as they are usually considered. A different asymmetry (although it looks very similar) is
in what we assume to be “fixed”, i.e., which properties of actual world we assume to be
true in possible counterfactual worlds. The past and not the future of the system is fixed.
It seems that while the first asymmetry can be easily removed, the second asymmetry is
unavoidable. According to standard quantum theory a system is described by its quantum
state. In the actual world, in which a certain measurement has been performed at time t
(or no measurement has been performed at t) the system is described by a certain state
before t, and by some state after time t. In the counterfactual world in which a different
measurement was performed at time t, the state before t is, of course, the same, but
the state after time t is invariably different (if the observables measured in actual and
counterfactual worlds have different eigenstates). Therefore, we cannot hold fixed the
quantum state of the system in the future.3
The argument above shows that for constructing time symmetric counterfactuals we
have to give up the description of a quantum system by its quantum state. Fortunately
we can do that without loosing anything except the change due to the measurement at
time t which caused the difficulty. A quantum state at a given time is completely defined
by the results of a complete set of measurements performed prior to this time. Therefore,
we can take the set of all results performed on a quantum system as a description of the
world of the system instead of describing the system by its quantum state. (This proposal
will also help to avoid ambiguity and some controversies related to the description of a
single quantum system by its quantum state.) Thus, I propose the following definition of
counterfactuals in the framework of quantum theory:
(ii) If a measurement M were performed at time t, then it would have
property P, provided that the results of all measurements performed on the
system at all times except the time t are fixed.
For time asymmetric situations in which only the results of measurements performed
before t are given (and thus only these results are fixed) this definition of counterfactuals
is equivalent to the counterfactuals as they usually have been used. However, when the
results of measurements performed on the systems both before and after the time t are
given, definition (ii) yields novel time-symmetrized counterfactuals. In particular, for the
ABL case, in which complete measurements are performed on the system at t1 and t2,
t1 < t < t2, we obtain
(iii) If a measurement of an observable C were performed at time t, then the
probability for C = ci would equal pi, provided that the results of measurements
performed on the system at times t1 and t2 are fixed.
3Note that none of these asymmetries exists in classical case because when a complete description of
a classical system is given at one time, it yields and fixes the complete description at all times and (ideal)
measurements at time t do not change the state of a classical system.
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The ABL formula (2) yields correct probabilities for counterfactuals defined as in (iii),
i.e., in the experiment in which C is measured at time t on the systems from pre- and
post-selected ensemble defined by fixed outcomes of the measurements at t1 and t2 (all
such systems and only such systems are considered) the frequency of an outcome ci is pi.
For the ABL situation one can also define a time asymmetric counterfactual:
(iv) Given the results of measurements at t1 and t2, t1 < t < t2 (in the
actual world), if a measurement of a observable C were performed at time t,
then the probability for C = ci would equal pi, provided that the results of all
measurements performed on the system at all times before time t are fixed.
In the framework of standard quantum theory the information about the result of measure-
ment at t2 is irrelevant: the probability for C = ci does not depend on this result. Thus,
it is obvious that the ABL formula (2), which includes the result of the measurement at
time t2 explicitly, does not yield counterfactual probabilities according to definition (iv).
One might modify definition (iv) in the framework of some “hidden variable” theory
with a natural additional requirement of fixing the hidden variables of the system in the
past. The properties of such counterfactuals will depend crucially on the details of the
hidden variable theory (see the discussion of Aharonov and Albert (1987) in the framework
of Bohm’s theory), but the ABL formula (2) is not valid for any such modification. In
order to show this consider a spin-1
2
particle which was found at t1 and at t2 in the
same state |↑z〉 (and no measurement has been performed at t). We ask what is the
(counterfactual) probability for finding spin “up” in the direction ξˆ which makes an angle
θ with the direction zˆ, at the intermediate time t. In this case, hidden variables, even if
they exist, cannot change that probability because any particle found at t1 in the state
|↑z〉, irrespectively of its hidden variable, yields the outcome “up” in the measurement at
t2. Therefore, the statistical predictions about the intermediate measurement at time t
must be the same as for the pre-selected only ensemble (these are identical ensembles in
this case), i.e.
Prob(↑ξ) = |〈↑ξ|↑z〉|2 = cos2(θ/2). (4)
The ABL formula, however, yields:
Prob(↑ξ) =
|〈↑z|P↑ξ |↑z〉|2
|〈↑z|P↑ξ |↑z〉|2 + |〈↑z|P↓ξ |↑z〉|2
=
cos4(θ/2)
cos4(θ/2) + sin4(θ/2)
. (5)
The fact that the ABL formula (2) does not hold for counterfactuals defined in (iv) or its
modifications is not surprising. Definition (iv) is explicitly asymmetric in time. The ABL
formula, however, is time symmetric and therefore it can hold only for time-symmetrized
counterfactuals.
A recent study of time’s arrow and counterfactuals in the framework of quantum
theory by Price (1996) seems to support my definition (ii). Let me quote from his section
“Counterfactuals: What should we fix?”:
Hold fixed the past, and the same difficulties arise all over again. Hold
fixed merely what is accessible, on the other hand, and it will be difficult to
see why this course was not chosen from the beginning. (1996, 179)
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This quotation looks very much like my proposal. Indeed, I find many arguments in
his book pointing in the same direction. However, in fact, this quotation represents a
time asymmetry: according to Price “merely what is accessible” is “an accessible past”.
But this is not the time asymmetry of the physical theory; Price writes: “no physical
asymmetry is required to explain it.” Although the book includes an extensive analysis of
a photon passing through two polarizers – the classic setup for the ABL case, I found no
explicit discussion of a possible measurement in between, the problem we discuss here.4
4. Inconsistency proofs. The key point of the criticism of the time-symmetrized
quantum theory (Sharp and Shanks 1993; Cohen 1995; Miller 1996) is the conflict between
counterfactual interpretations of the ABL rule and predictions of quantum theory. I
shall argue here that the inconsistency proofs are unfounded and therefore the criticism
essentially breaks apart.
The structure of all these inconsistency proofs is a follows. Three consecutive mea-
surements are considered. The first is the preparation of the state |Ψ1〉 at time t1. The
probabilities for the results ai of the second measurement at time t are considered. The
final measurement at time t2 is introduced in order to allow the analysis using the ABL
formula. Sharp and Shanks consider three consecutive spin component measurements
of a spin-1
2
particle in different directions. Cohen analyzes a particular single-particle
interference experiment. It is a variation of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two
detectors for the final measurement and the possibility of placing a third detector for the
intermediate measurement. Finally, Miller repeated the argument for a system of tandem
Mach-Zehnder interferometers. In all these cases the “pre-selection only” situation is con-
sidered. It is unnatural to apply the time-symmetrized formalism for such cases. However,
it must be possible. Thus, I need not show that the time-symmetrized formalism has an
advantage over the standard formalism for describing these situations, but I only that it
is consist with the predictions of the standard quantum theory.
In the standard approach to quantum theory the probability for the result of a mea-
surement of A at time t is given by Eq. 1. The claim of all the proofs is that the
counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule yields a different result. In all cases the
final measurement at time t2 has two possible outcomes which we signify as “1f” and
“2f”. The suggested application of the ABL rule is as follows. The probability for the
result ai is:
Prob(A = ai) = Prob(1f) Prob(A = ai|1f) + Prob(2f) Prob(A = ai|2f), (6)
where Prob(A = ai|1f) and Prob(A = ai|2f) are the conditional probabilities given by
the ABL formula, Eq. 2, and Prob(1f) and Prob(2f) are the probabilities for the results
4Price briefly and critically mentions the ABL paper. He writes (1996, 208): “What they [ABL] fail
to note, however, is that their argument does nothing to address the problem for those who disagree with
Einstein – those who think that the state function is a complete description, so that the change that
takes place on measurements is a real change in the world, rather than merely change in our knowledge of
the world.” This seems to me an unfair criticism: ABL clearly state that in the situations they consider
“the complete description” is given by two wave functions (see more in Aharonov and Vaidman 1991).
Moreover, it seems to me that the development of this time-symmetrized quantum formalism is not too
far from the spirit of the “advanced action” – the Price vision of the solution of the time’s arrow problem.
7
of the final measurement. In the proofs, the authors show that Eq. 6 is not valid and
conclude that the ABL formula is not applicable for this example and therefore that it is
not applicable in general.
I will argue that the error in calculating equality (6) is not in the conditional proba-
bilities given by the ABL formula, but in the calculation of the probabilities Prob(1f) and
Prob(2f) of the final measurement. In all three cases it was calculated on the assumption
that no measurement took place at time t. Clearly, one cannot make this assumption here
since then the discussion about the probability of the result of the measurement at time
t is meaningless. Unperformed measurements have no results (Peres, 1978). Thus, there
is no surprise that the value for the probability Prob(A = ai) obtained in this way comes
out different from the value predicted by the quantum theory.
Straightforward calculations show that if one uses the formula (6) with the probabilities
Prob(1f) and Prob(2f) calculated on the condition that the intermediate measurement has
been performed, then the outcome is the same as predicted by the standard formalism of
quantum theory. Consider, for example, the experiment suggested by Sharp and Shanks,
consecutive spin measurements with the three directions in the same plane and the relative
angles θab and θbc. The probability for the final result “up” is
Prob(1f) = cos
2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2), (7)
and the probability for the final result “down” is
Prob(2f) = cos
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2). (8)
The ABL formula yields
Prob(up|1f) = cos
2(θab/2) cos
2(θbc/2)
cos2(θab/2) cos2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2)
(9)
and
Prob(up|2f) = cos
2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2)
cos2(θab/2) sin
2(θbc/2) + sin
2(θab/2) cos2(θbc/2)
. (10)
Substituting all these equations into Eq. 6 we obtain
Prob(up) = cos2(θab/2). (11)
This result coincide with the prediction of the standard quantum theory. It is a straight-
forward exercise to show in the same way that no inconsistency arises also in the examples
of Cohen5 and Miller.
I have shown that one can apply the time-symmetrized formalism, including the ABL
formula, for analyzing the examples which allegedly lead to contradictions in the incon-
sistency proofs. In my analysis there was nothing “counterfactual”. The proofs, however,
claimed to show that a “counterfactual interpretation” of the ABL rule leads to contradic-
tion. What I have shown is that the examples presented in the proofs do not correspond
5In Cohen’s example the measurement at time t2 is not a complete measurement and therefore the
ABL formula (2) is not applicable for this case. The analysis requires a generalization of the ABL formula
given in Vaidman (1997).
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to counterfactual situations and this is why they cannot be analyzed in a counterfactual
way. The contradictions in the proofs arise from a logical error in taking together the
statement “no measurement has been performed at t” and a statement about probability
of a result of this measurement which requires “the measurement has been performed
at t”. Let me demonstrate how similar erroneous “counterfactual” reasoning can lead
to a contradiction in quantum theory even in cases when the ABL rule is not involved.
Consider two consecutive measurements of σx performed on a spin-
1
2
particle prepared in
a state |↑z〉. Let us ask (using the language of Sharp and Shanks) what is the probability
that these measurements would have had the results σx(t1) = σx(t2) = 1 given that no
such measurements in fact took place. Each spin measurement, if performed separately,
has probability 1
2
for the result σx = 1. According to standard quantum theory the fact
that in the actual world the measurement at t1 has been performed and σx(t1) = 1 has
been obtained does not ensure that in a counterfactual world in which σx was not mea-
sured at t1, but at a later time t2, the outcome has to be σx(t2) = 1, rather we still have
probability 1
2
for this result. Thus, counterfactual reasoning leads us to the erroneous
result that the probability for σx(t1) = σx(t2) = 1 is
1
2
× 1
2
= 1
4
.
5. Time asymmetry prejudice. In my approach the pre- and post-selected states
are given. Only intermediate measurements are to be discussed. So the frequently posed
question about the probability of the result of the post-selection measurement is irrelevant.
It seems to me that the critics of the time-symmetrized quantum theory use in their
arguments the preconception of an asymmetry. It is not surprising then that they reach
various contradictions. Probably the first to go according to this line were Bub and
Brown:
Put simply, systems initially in the state ψI which are subjected to an N
measurement, and subsequently yield the state ψF after an MF measurement,
would not necessarily yield this final state if subjected to a measurement of
M instead of N . (1986, 2338)
Their argument is valid (see Albert et al. 1986) in the context of the possible hidden
variable theories which allow us to predict the results of measurements, but it should not
be brought against proposals of a time-symmetrized formalism as it was done frequently
later. Let me consider two examples: Cohen writes:
We have no reason to expect that, for example, theN/4 systems preselected
by |ψ1(t1)〉 and post-selected by |ψ2(t2)〉 after an intermediate measurement of
σ1y would still have yielded the state |ψ2〉 after an intermediate measurement
of σ2x or of σ1yσ2x instead of σ1y.(1995, 4375)
A consistent time-symmetrized approach should question the pre-selection on the same
footing as the post-selection; or rather not question any of them, as I propose.
Another asymmetry pre-conception leads to the “retrodiction paradox” of Peres (1994).
The asymmetry which he considered is, in fact, between prediction based on the results
of measurements in the past of time t in question and inference based on the results of
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measurements performed both in the past and in the future of time t. This inference he
erroneously considered as retrodiction (see Aharonov and Vaidman 1995).
If we are not considering a pre- and post-selected system then there is an asymmetry
between prediction and retrodiction. For example (Aharonov and Vaidman 1990, 11-12),
assume that the x component of the spin of a spin-1
2
particle was measured at time t, and
was found to be σx = 1. While there is a symmetry regarding prediction and retrodiction
for the result of measuring σx after or before time t (in both cases we are certain that
σx = 1), there is an asymmetry regarding the results of measuring σy. We can predict
equal probabilities for each outcome, σy = ±1, of a measurement performed after time t,
but we cannot claim the same for the result of a measurement of σy performed before time
t. The difference arises from the usual assumption that there is no “boundary condition” in
the future, but there is a boundary condition in the past: the state in which the particle
was prepared before time t. Maybe in a somewhat artificial way we can reconstruct
the symmetry even here, out of the context of pre- and post-selected systems. We can
“erase” the results of the measurements of the spin measurements in the past (Vaidman
1987, 61). In order to do this we perform at time t0, before time t, a measurement of a
Bell-type operator on our particle and another auxiliary particle, an ancilla. We ensure
that no measurement is performed on the particle between t0 and t (except the possible
measurement whose result we want to consider) and we prevent any measurement on the
ancilla from time t0 and on. The Bell-type measurement correlates the quantum state of
our particle evolving from the past with the results of the future measurement performed
on the ancilla. Since the latter is unknown, we obtain, effectively, an unknown past for
our particle. Now, for such a system, if we know that the result of the measurement at
time t is σx = 1, we can also retrodict that there are equal probabilities for both outcomes
of the measurement of σy performed before time t (but after time t0). The time symmetry
is restored.6
6. Time symmetry of the process of measurement. Obviously, in order to discuss
a measurement at time t between two other measurements in a time symmetric way, the
process of measurement at time t must be time symmetric. Usually, a measurement of a
quantum observable A is modeled by the von Neumann (1955) Hamiltonian
H = g(t)pA, (12)
where p is the momentum conjugate to the pointer variable q, and the normalized coupling
function g(t) specifies the time of the measurement interaction. The function g(t) can be
made symmetric in time (not that it matters) and the form of the coupling then is time
symmetric. The result of the measurement is the difference between the value of q before
and after the measurement interaction. So it seems that everything is time symmetric.
However, usually there is an asymmetry in that that the initial position of the pointer
is customized to be zero (and therefore the final position correspond to the measured value
of A). This seemingly minor aspect points to a genuine asymmetry. Of course, the initial
zero position of the pointer is not a necessary condition; we can choose any other initial
6The time symmetry is restored not just for the σy measurement, but for any spin measurement.
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position as well. But, we cannot chose the final position. We know the initial position and
we find out, at the end of the measurement the final position. We can introduce another
step with symmetrical coupling, but we will not be able to remove the basic asymmetry:
we do not know the result of a measurement before the measurement but we do know it
after the measurement.
This asymmetry in time is an intrinsic property of the concept of measurement and is
not specific to the quantum theory. It is related to the arrow of time based on the increas-
ing memory. See illuminating discussion of Bitbol (1988) of the process of measurement
in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation (Everett, 1957).
The symmetry aspect of the process of measurement which is important for our discus-
sion is that the process of measurement at time t affects identically forward and backward
evolving states. A possible operational test of this condition is, that the probabilities
for measurements performed immediately after t, given a certain incoming state and no
information from the future, are identical to probabilities for the same measurements per-
formed immediately before t, given the same (complex conjugate) incoming state evolving
backward in time and no information from the past (see erasure procedure described in
previous section). The measurement described by the Hamiltonian (12) has this time
symmetry. Moreover, any “ideal” von Neumann measurement, which projects on the
property to be measured and does not change the quantum state if it has the measured
property, is symmetric in this sense.
Recently, Shimony (1997) proposed considering more general quantum measurements
which do not change the measured property (so they are repeatable, the main property
which is required from a “good” measurement) but which change the state (even if it
has the measured property). He constructed an example of this kind of measurements
for which the ABL formula yields incorrect probabilities. However, the measurement he
proposed is explicitly asymmetric in time and it breaks the time symmetry requirement
stated above. Therefore, one should not expect the ABL formula to hold for this case.7
In the appendix to his paper Shimony presented an example which shows that “The
second kind of time symmetry, concerning the interchange of initial and final conditions,
fails even in the case of ideal measurements.” Indeed, this symmetry holds only (as
is assumed in this paper and in most papers on two-state vector formalism) if the free
Hamiltonian is zero. In Shimony’s example the free Hamiltonian was not zero, he assumed
only that it is time independent. The basic symmetry is for interchanging backward and
forward evolving states “entering” time t, and thus the free Hamiltonian in the periods
of time (t1, t) and (t, t2) is irrelevant. It is relevant only for choosing appropriate mea-
surements at t1 and t2 in order to get this basic symmetry. This symmetry is formally
equivalent to “the first kind of time symmetry of Shimony” in which he considered “re-
versal of measurement”. Reversed measurement is related to reversed time’s arrow and
although it can be analyzed theoretically we cannot make Shimony’s reversed measure-
ments in laboratory. This is why, instead of discussing “reversed measurement” at t, I
prefer to discuss time symmetry under appropriate interchange of measurements before
and after time t.
7Note also an unusual property of Shimony’s measurements in a situation in which the ABL formula
is not involved: measurements of this type of commuting observables might disturb each other.
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7. Elements of Reality. Important counterfactuals in quantum theory are “elements
of reality”. For comparison, I’ll start with a definition of time asymmetric element of
reality:
(v) If we can predict with certainty that the result of measuring at time
t of an observable A is a, then, at time t, there exists an element of reality
A = a.
This is, essentially, a quotation from Redhead (1987), who, however considered it as a
sufficient condition and not as a definition. Redhead was inspired by the criteria for
elements of reality of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR). In spite of similarity in its
form, the EPR criteria, taken as a definition, is very different: “If, without in any way
disturbing the system, we can predict with certainty the value of a physical quantity...”
The crucial difference is that “predict” in the EPR definition means to find out using
certain (non-disturbing) measurements, while in my definition “predict” means to deduce
using existing information. Thus, for two spin-1
2
particles in a singlet state, the value
of a spin component of a single particle in any direction is an element of reality in the
EPR sense (it can be found out by measuring another particle) and there is no elements
of reality for a spin component value in any direction according to my definition (in the
EPR state, the probability to find spin “up” in any direction is 1
2
).
Definition (v) of elements of reality is asymmetric in time because of the word “pre-
dict”. I have proposed a modification of this definition applicable for time symmetric
elements of reality (Vaidman 1993a):
(vi) If we can infer with certainty that the result of measuring at time
t of an observable A is a, then, at time t, there exists an element of reality
A = a.
The word “infer” is neutral relative to past and future. The inference about results at
time t is based on the results of measurements on the system performed both before and
after time t. Note, that in some situations we can “infer” more facts than can be obtained
by “prediction” based on the results in the past and “retrodiction” based on the results
in the future (relative to t) together.
The difference between definitions of “elements of reality”, (v) and (vi), and definitions
of counterfactuals in quantum theory (iv) and (iii) is that the property P in (v) and (vi)
is constrained to “the result of measuring at time t of an observable A is a”. In fact,
time asymmetric “elements or reality” (v), defined as “predictions”, do not represent
“interesting” counterfactuals. There is no nontrivial set of such counterfactual statements,
i.e., set of statements which cannot be tested all on a single system. Indeed, all observables
the measurement of which yield definite outcomes for a pre-selected system can be tested
together. One way to extend the definition of time asymmetric elements of reality in order
to get nontrivial counterfactuals is to consider “multiple-time measurements” (instead of
measurements at time t only). Another extension, which corresponds to numerous analysis
in the literature, is to go beyond statements about observables which have definite values:
(vii) If we can predict with certainty a certain relation between the results
aj of measuring at time t a set of observables Aj , then, at time t, there exists
a “generalized element of reality” which is this relation between aj’s.
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A simple example of this kind is a system of two spin-1
2
particles prepared, at t1, in a
singlet state
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉1|↓〉2 − |↓〉1|↑〉2). (13)
We can predict with certainty that the results of measurements of spin components of the
two particles fulfill the following two relations:
{σ1x}+ {σ2x} = 0, (14)
{σ1y}+ {σ2y} = 0, (15)
where {σ1x} signifies the result of measurement of spin x component of the first particle,
etc. The relations (14) and (15) represent set of generalized elements of reality (vii). This
is a nontrivial set of counterfactuals because (14) and (15) cannot be tested together: the
measurement of σ1x disturbs the measurement of σ1y as well as the measurement of σ2x
disturbs the measurement of σ2y.
In contrast, the set of elements of reality (vi) given by
{σ1x + σ2x} = 0, (16)
{σ1y + σ2y} = 0, (17)
can be tested on a single system, see Aharonov and Vaidman (1986) for description of such
measurements. Yet another set of counterfactuals, which consists of definite statements
about measurements, but which does not fall into category (vi) because these are two-time
measurements performed at two different time moments t1 and t2, cannot be tested on a
single system:
{σ1x(t1) + σ2x(t2)} = 0, (18)
{σ1y(t2) + σ2y(t1)} = 0. (19)
Note a situation which involves only a single free spin-1
2
particle. The particle is prepared,
before t1, t1 < t2 < t3, in the state |↑y〉. Then, a nontrivial set of counterfactuals is:
{σx(t1)− σx(t3)} = 0, (20)
{σy(t2)} = 1. (21)
In this example, however, statement (20) has somewhat different character because it
depends not on the results of measurements performed on the particle before or after
the period of time (t1, t2), but on the fact that the system was not disturbed during this
period of time.
8. Quantum Puzzles. In this section I shall describe a few interesting tasks which
cannot be performed in the framework of classical physics and in the solution of which
quantum counterfactuals are involved.
The first example considers a game for a team of three players, A,B and C. The
players are allowed to make any preparations before they will be taken to three remote
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locations. Then, at a certain time, each of them will be asked one out of two possible
questions: “what is the value of X?” or “what is the value of Y ?”. According to the rules
of the game, either all three will be asked the X question, or just one will be asked the X
question and the two others will be asked the Y question. The answers to both questions
are limited to two possibilities: 1 or −1. In order to win, the answers of the team should
fulfill one of the following relations:
XAXBXC = −1, (22)
XAYBYC = 1, (23)
YAXBYC = 1, (24)
YAYBXC = 1, (25)
with obvious notation: XA is the answer of A on question X , etc. What should the team
do in order to win for sure?
It seems that that the task is impossible. Since the distance between the players
of the team does not allow interchange of any messages sent after they were asked the
questions, it is natural to assume that delaying the decision of which answer to give for
each question until the question is actually asked cannot help. Thus, an optimal strategy
should correspond to definite decisions of each player which answers to give for both
possible questions. But it is easy to prove that any such strategy cannot ensure winning
for all allowed combinations of questions. Indeed, if it does, then there must be a set
of answers {XA, YA, XB, YB, XC, YC} such that all equations (22-25) are fulfilled. This
however is impossible, because the product of all left hand sides of equations (22-25)
is the product of squares of numbers which are ±1 and therefore it equals 1, while the
product of all right hand sides of these equation yields −1.
Nevertheless, quantum theory provides a solution (Greenberg, Horne, and Zeilinger
1989; Mermin 1990). Each member of the team takes with him a spin-1
2
particle. The
particles are prepared in a correlated state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉A|↑〉B|↑〉C − |↓〉A|↓〉B|↓〉C). (26)
Now, if a member of the team is asked the X question, he measures σx and gives the
answer which he obtains in his experiment. If he is asked the Y question, he measures σy
instead. Quantum theory ensures that the team following this strategy always wins.
For the system of three spin-1
2
particles in the state (26) we have the following set of
“generalized elements of reality” (vii):
{σAx}{σBx}{σCx} = −1, (27)
{σAx}{σBy}{σCy} = 1, (28)
{σAy}{σBx}{σCy} = 1, (29)
{σAy}{σBy}{σCx} = 1. (30)
Here {σAx} signifies the outcome of the measurement of σx by player A etc. There is no
possibility of having a system of three particles on which all these relations are tested.
Therefore, this is a nontrivial set of counterfactuals.
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The importance of this example is not only that it shows how a “quantum” team
can win against any “classical” team. This example yields a simple proof of the nonexis-
tence of local hidden variables telling the results of each local measurement prior to their
performance.
Let us turn now to a puzzle which involves quantum time-symmetrized counterfactuals
(Vaidman et al. 1987, Mermin 1995). Alice and Bob play the following game: Alice has
a spin-1
2
particle which she gives to Bob at time t when he can perform a single spin
component measurement in the xˆ, yˆ, or zˆ direction. After the measurement, Bob gives
the particle back to Alice without telling her which measurement he did. Alice’s task is
to tell Bob the results of his measurements for all his possible choices.
In this problem Alice makes a measurement before time t and another measurement
after time t. At the end she must know a nontrivial set of counterfactual statements about
measurements at time t:
{σx} = x, (31)
{σy} = y, (32)
{σz} = z, (33)
where x, y and z can have values ±1. Note that (31-33) are elements of reality according
to definition (vi).
Let us first consider a trivial puzzle of this kind, when Bob is limited to measurements
of spin components in only two directions, xˆ and yˆ. All what Alice has to do in this
case is to measure, say, σx before time t and σy after time t. Then, the result of the first
measurement is x and the second measurement yields y.
If Bob has a choice of three possible spin measurements, the solution is much more
difficult. Alice should prepare a correlated state of this and another spin-1
2
particle, keep
the other particle undisturbed, and make a special joint measurement on both particles
after she gets the first one from Bob (see details in Vaidman et al. 1987). She cannot
control the outcome of her second measurement, but she can construct the measurement
in such a way that for every outcome (out of four possibilities) she will have an infinite set
of time symmetric counterfactuals about measurements at time t: spin components for
every direction belonging to a certain cone will be known. For appropriate measurement
all four possible cones will include xˆ, yˆ, and zˆ axes. Thus, for any possible outcome of
the final measurement Alice will know the set of counterfactuals (31-33).
Obviously, the set of statements (31-33) is a “nontrivial” set of counterfactuals. Indeed,
elements of reality (31-33) cannot be tested on a single particle because the operators σˆx,
σˆy and σˆz do not commute. It is interesting that in some cases, elements of reality of a
pre- and post-selected quantum system related even to commuting observables cannot be
tested together. Consider again two spin-1
2
particles prepared in the singlet state (13).
At t2 the particles are found in the state |Ψ2〉 = |↑x〉1|↑y〉2. A set of elements of reality
for these particles at an intermediate time is (use the ABL formula (2) to see this):
{σ1y} = −1, (34)
{σ2x} = −1, (35)
{σ1yσ2x} = −1. (36)
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Even the first two elements of reality (34-35) cannot be tested together, in spite of the
fact that these are statements about two separated particles.
Another interesting feature of time symmetric elements of reality (vi) of a pre- and
post-selected quantum system is that the “product rule” does not hold. The product rule
means that if A = a and B = b are elements of reality, then AB = ab is also an element of
reality. (This product rule does hold for elements of reality (v) of a pre-selected quantum
system.) Indeed, in the above example (34-36) we have: {σ1yσ2x} 6= {σ1y}{σ2x}. Note,
that in this example there is no “generalized element of reality” (vii) for {σ1y}{σ2x}: the
product of the results of simultaneous measurements of observables σ1y and σ2x can be 1
or −1. Therefore, the product rule of a different type: “if A = a and B = b are elements
of reality, then {A}{B} = ab is a generalized element of reality” does not hold either.
The failure of the product rule is important for discussing Lorentz invariance of a
realistic quantum theory. Recently, extensive discussions of the impossibility of a realistic
Lorentz invariant quantum theory were based on the (unjustified) assumption of the
validity of the product rule (Hardy 1992; Vaidman 1993a, 1993b; Cohen and Hiley 1995,
1996).
9. Weak Measurements. One might argue about the significance of time-symmetrized
counterfactuals beyond the philosophical construction of (jointly unmeasurable) “elements
of reality”, since it is impossible to perform incompatible measurements on a single sys-
tem. I find the most important aspect of these concepts to be their relation to weak
measurements (Aharonov and Vaidman 1990).
Weak measurements are almost standard measurement procedures with weakened cou-
pling. Weak measurements essentially do not change the quantum states (evolving forward
and backwards in time) of the system. Several weak measurements can be performed on a
single system and they are compatible even though their counterparts, the ideal measure-
ments are not compatible. The outcomes of weak measurements are weak values, Eq. 3.
Weak values have many interesting properties, in particular (A+B)w = Aw+Bw even for
non-commuting observables A and B. I also defined the outcomes of weak measurements
as weak-measurement elements of reality (Vaidman, 1996). The weak value is not just a
theoretical concept related to a gedanken experiment. Recently, weak values have been
measured in a real laboratory (e.g. Ritchie et al. 1991).
An interesting connection between weak and strong (ideal) measurements is the theo-
rem (Aharonov and Vaidman 1991) which says that if the probability for a certain value
to be the result of a strong measurement is 1, then the corresponding weak measurement
must yield the same value, i.e. element of reality A = a, implies weak-measurement ele-
ment of reality Aw = a. Although a set of statements about weak-measurement elements
of reality does not fall under the category of “a nontrivial set of counterfactuals” (because
one can always consider a pre- and post-selected ensemble on which all week measurements
of the set are performed together), I find the application of “counterfactuals” for such sit-
uations most appropriate. When we discuss the outcomes of weak measurements, the
statements about strong measurement are literally counterfactual. The reasoning about
unperformed strong measurements helps us to find out the results of performed weak mea-
surements. For example, in the situation described by elements of reality (31-33) the weak
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measurement of σx+σy+σz will yield (σx+σy+σz)w = (σx)w+(σy)w+(σz)w = x+y+z.
It might be that x = y = z = 1. Then, (σx + σy + σz)w = 3, in spite of the fact that
the eigenvalues of σx + σy + σz are ±
√
3. Moreover, a weak measurement of spin in any
direction will yield a projection of a “weak-measurement spin vector” whose size is 3 on
this direction (Aharonov and Vaidman 1991).
Let me add another, even more striking, example of a situation in which counter-
factuals about strong measurements help to find out properties of weak measurements.
Consider a single particle prepared at t1 in a superposition of being in three separated
boxes:
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉). (37)
At later time t2 the particle was found in another superposition:
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉). (38)
In between no measurement was performed on this particle, but it coupled very weekly
to some other systems. The question is: how one can characterize this coupling?
A set of counterfactual statements for this particle is
PA = 1, (39)
PB = 1, (40)
PA +PB +PC = 1. (41)
Or, in words: if we open box A, we find the particle there for sure; if we open box B
(instead), we also find the particle there for sure; if we open all boxes, we find the particle
there for sure. These counterfactual statements help us to find out statements about
weak-measurement elements of reality:
(PA)w = 1, (42)
(PB)w = 1, (43)
(PA +PB +PC)w = 1. (44)
From these results we can also deduce that (PC)w = −1. Thus, the counterfactual
statements (39-41) help us to answer the question posed above: for every sufficiently
weak interaction, the effective coupling to this single particle is equivalent to the weak
coupling to a single particle in box A, a single particle in box B and minus one particle in
box C. The meaning of the latter is that for a pre- and post-selected ensemble of many
such particles there is an effective negative pressure in box C. (An experiment which will
test this is very difficult because the probability to obtain such an ensemble is very low.)
9. Conclusions. The main goal of this paper is to defend the time-symmetrized
quantum formalism, originated by the ABL paper, against recent criticism. The time-
symmetrized formalism of quantum theory requires certain properties of quantum mea-
surements. I discussed some proposed time asymmetric procedures which fulfill some of
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the properties of quantum measurement, and for which the time-symmetrized formalism
yields incorrect predictions. I showed, however, that for any ideal measurement as well as
for any von Neumann type measurement (ideal or not ideal) the time-symmetrized for-
malism is valid. This answers some of the criticism of the time-symmetrized formalism.
However, the key argument of the critics was different; it was an alleged proof, repeated
by several authors, showing that in certain situations counterfactual interpretation of the
ABL rule leads to a contradiction with the predictions of quantum theory. I argued here
that these situations were not of “counterfactual” nature. The way of reasoning which
lead the authors to a contradiction was not the “counterfactual interpretation of the ABL
rule” but a logical error. The error was in calculating the probability for the result of a
certain experiment assuming that this experiments was not performed. Not only that the
authors of the proof assume that the measurement was not performed in the actual world
(as is usually done in discussing counterfactuals in quantum theory) but also that it was
not performed in the counterfactual world, for which the statements about the probability
of the result of this measurement was made.
The argumentation of the critics of the time-symmetrized quantum formalism was
that the ABL rule for the cases when the measurement was actually performed is correct,
but philosophically not interesting, while the counterfactual interpretation is interesting
but incorrect. Showing that their “counterfactual interpretation” is incorrect still leaves
us with the claim that time-symmetrized formalism “yields no fresh insights about the
fundamental interpretive issues in quantum mechanics” (Sharp and Shanks, 1993). In
order to refute this argument I made an analysis of counterfactuals in quantum theory
which I believe is important by itself. I narrowed the concept of “counterfactuals” to
statements about properties of the results of quantum measurements which would be valid
if these measurements were performed. The crucial issue for counterfactuals in quantum
theory is what is held “fixed” in counterfactual worlds. I proposed defining “results
of all measurements (except measurements at time t)” as all that is fixed. I showed
that this definition for a pre-selected situations is equivalent to the usual definition of
counterfactuals. However, contrary to the usual approach, this definition is also applicable
for pre- and post-selected situation, and it yields time-symmetrized counterfactuals with
the results of measurements fixed both in the past and in the future.
The first nontrivial type of situations for which these counterfactuals can be applied
is when there is a set of statements which cannot be tested on a single system. Therefore,
the set of counterfactual statements about quantum system on which these measurement
might have been performed cannot be equivalent to a set of statements about actually
performed measurements. There are such sets of nontrivial counterfactuals both for pre-
selected only quantum systems and for pre- and post-quantum systems. (Note, however,
that only for pre- and post-selected situations there are nontrivial sets of counterfactuals
which are “elements of reality”, i.e. definite results of measurements. For pre-selected
situations, definite properties of the results of measurements have to be considered.) These
nontrivial sets of counterfactuals play an important role in ongoing discussions of the
locality and Lorentz invariance of quantum theory.
The second application of time-symmetrized counterfactuals I have presented here is
the connection between “elements of reality” and weak coupling to a quantum system. I
considered a pre- and post-selected system on which no intermediate strong measurements
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were performed. Then, “elements of reality” are literally counterfactual statements about
definite results of measurements which actually were not performed. These counterfactual
statements helped to characterize weak measurements which actually took place. The
outcomes of these weak measurements are weak values (another time symmetric concept)
which yield a simple picture of a pre- and post-selected quantum system. I find this
picture important because it allowed us to see numerous surprising quantum effects which
are hidden in the framework of the standard approach in a very complicated mathematics
of some peculiar interference effects (e.g. Aharonov et al. 1987, 1990, 1993; Vaidman
1991).
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